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EDITORIAL @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION4
The evolving nature of humanitarian mine action—particularly in areas such as Iraq 
and Syria—has generated debate as to whether new standards on improvised explo-
sive devices (IED) should be included in current International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS), or whether such standards specific to IEDs should stand alone. We invited 
opinion on this subject, encourage conversation and debate, and welcome responses 
to be published online and/or in print in Issue 22.1.
The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison University, or 
the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.
If readers would like to respond to editorials contained herein or submit an edi-
torial to The Journal, please contact the publications staff at: cisr-journal@jmu.edu.
by Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
Improvised explosive devices (IED) are not new in mine action; they have contributed to explosive ordnance contamination in post-conflict settings since the advent of humanitarian demin-
ing almost 30 years ago.1,2 
What is new is that the systematic deployment of IEDs by armed 
groups is occurring today on a greater scale. The prevalence of use 
of these weapons by highly visible groups such as the Islamic State 
has accentuated the profile of IEDs even further. In addition, a large 
proportion of the IEDs deployed are victim-operated (VOIED) and 
contribute to a new landmine emergency characterized by a system-
atic production, standardization of designs, and the deployment of 
hundreds of thousands of locally-manufactured landmines. These 
recent developments have led to debate on how IEDs are defined in 
relation to key conventions such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC), on the required competency levels needed to 
engage in IED disposal (IEDD) activities, and on the applicability 
of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to provide the 
framework for mine action operations concerning IEDs.
This editorial provides a historic perspective on the extent of 
IEDD operations conducted by mine action actors, explains the 
scope and applicability of the IMAS to address all explosive ord-
nance including improvised devices, and suggests amendments to 
the IMAS to provide improved guidance to respond to IED contam-
ination in a humanitarian context.3 
A Historical Perspective
Since the late 1980s, humanitarian demining in Afghanistan 
has addressed VOIEDs as an integral part of mine action op-
erations. The HALO Trust, for instance, has cleared over 1,400 
IEDs in Afghanistan during this period. In Sri Lanka, the same 
organization has cleared almost 74,000 locally-manufactured 
landmines (over one-third of all landmines cleared by the orga-
nization in Sri Lanka), and some 1,250 more complex IEDs since 
2002. In Colombia, a further 280 locally-manufactured land-
mines were cleared by The HALO Trust between 2013 and 2016.4 
In Iraq and Syria, during the course of the last 12 months, 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) cleared nearly 16,000 IEDs, mostly 
locally-manufactured landmines, but also sizeable numbers of 
radio-controlled, and command-detonated anti-vehicle devices 
that were abandoned (see Figures 3 and 4).5
Elsewhere in the world, improvised devices are addressed within 
mine action programs from Africa (e.g., Angola), to Europe (e.g., 
Kosovo), and to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand). Few major conflicts 
have occurred where improvised devices have not contributed to ex-
plosive contamination. In all these cases, the survey and clearance 
of improvised devices by mine action operators were undertaken 
within the framework of the IMAS. Image 2 presents examples of 
the wide array of IEDs addressed by mine action operators.
Colombia is a case in point. A large portion of the territory in 
Colombia is contaminated with IEDs laid by armed groups (see 
Figure 1). The great majority of the IEDs are victim-operated, 
locally-manufactured landmines (see Image 1), but other types of 
devices including timer-initiated and command-initiated IEDs are 
also present. Among further threats, there are gas cylinders used as 
projectiles, as well as improvised mortars and rockets, which often 
use explosives that have been prepared in an artisanal manner. In 
Colombia, 11,485 victims have been recorded since 1990.6 
Colombia has been guided by the IMAS in its efforts to address 
this contamination. It has used them to develop a full set of National 
Mine Action Standards (NMAS) as a framework to manage the na-
tional program of land release. 
The Objective and Scope of the IMAS
The IMAS have been developed to provide a safety, quality, and 
operational framework for mine action and to promote a com-
mon and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action oper-
ations. The IMAS provide guidance, establish principles, and—in 
some cases—define international requirements and specifications. 
They offer a frame of reference, which encourages managers of mine 
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levels of effectiveness and safety. The IMAS provide a common lan-
guage, and recommends the formats and rules for handling data, 
which enables the accurate and timely exchange of information.7 
The IMAS are not themselves standard operating procedures 
(SOP). They provide a framework for NMAS, local SOPs, rules, in-
structions, and codes of practice—documents that provide more 
details on how mine action requirements are to be achieved in a par-
ticular context.
Critically, the IMAS are framed by a humanitarian imperative 
where landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are con-
sidered first and foremost a humanitarian concern and should 
be addressed from a humanitarian perspective (see Figure 2). In 
this regard, the framing of standards and their application to na-
tional mine action programs ref lect the fundamental humanitar-
ian principles of neutrality, impartiality, equality, and humanity 
so that mine action is focused on giving support to those who are 
most vulnerable.8 
Mine action operations are therefore not defined by weap-
on type (i.e., they include improvised devices) but by the ob-
jectives they pursue (i.e., humanitarian) and by the context 
in which they are conducted (i.e., one that permits respect for 
humanitarian principles).
As mentioned, the engagement of mine action operators in 
IEDD has, and should continue to follow, the same principles 
used for humanitarian demining operations. As such, engagement 
should continue to be based on a positive response to the following 
four questions: 
• Is the aim of the task humanitarian (as opposed to security 
or military)?
• Is the environment conducive for safe and secure operations?
• Is humanitarian access possible and the device out of play 
and cold?9 
• Does the operator have the necessary skills and equipment to 
undertake the relevant search and disposal operation?
If a threat assessment determines that an IED is still within an 
active setting and no humanitarian access is possible, then it is a mat-
ter for relevant security forces to address. Furthermore, if a device is of 
a complexity that requires a skillset or equipment that is not present, 
then additional internal competencies must be developed, equip-
ment purchased or specialist assistance requested. Such an approach 
is not restricted to IEDs but is the same for all explosive ordnance dis-
posal (EOD) operations concerning landmines and ERW.
None of this is meant to downplay the challenges associated with 
responses to IEDs. However, it is important to note that adopting a 
sound, risk-management approach for IEDs is similar to that for the 
wide spectrum of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which can range from 
simple items, such as grenades, all the way through to complex items 
such as surface-to-air missiles with hypergolic, liquid-fueled systems. 
Factors that Complicate the Debate on IEDs
Current debates on who should be doing what and where with 
regards to IEDD, particularly in the Middle East, are testament to 
Figure 1. Extent of mine contamination in Colombia (2017).
Figure courtesy of DAICMA.
Image 1. An example of an improvised landmine found in Colombia.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
What are the limitations for mine action 
operators to engage with IEDs? Is this 
different from other explosive devices?
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the existence of differing perspectives on IEDs. Military, commer-
cial, and NGO operators all have valid positions but also different 
objectives and references in their work, as well as different modali-
ties, competencies, and capabilities. 
The current debate has some strong parallels with those asso-
ciated with the early days of mine action when
• Issues of ownership of the topic of demining between NGOs, 
commercial, and military took place.
• NGO involvement in broader EOD—in addition to demin-
ing—was questioned. 
• Challenges existed in understanding requirements for a transi-
tion from a military context to a humanitarian one. 
• There was a need to establish competence requirements for 
humanitarian operations and associated training responses.
In all these past instances, the conclusions of the debates result-
ed in the increase of empowerment of mine action actors and ul-
timately the strengthening of the IMAS to more comprehensively 
frame operations that support humanitarian objectives. 
In the current debate on ownership of the IED issue, it is impor-
tant to safeguard the IMAS as the principle framework for IEDD 
work that is bounded by the objectives and contexts appropriate 
for mine action. To optimize the effectiveness of IEDD activities, 
however, collaboration between military, commercial, and NGO 
operators is important at a procedural level, including appropriate 
information exchange.
Current discussions on IEDs from both a political and operation-
al perspective are complicated by the term IED, that is not at all spe-
cific but used to describe many different devices which may have 
only one thing in common—the fact that their construction is im-
provised or that they are locally-manufactured. The many types and 
classifications of IEDs vary from simple to complex, and have been 
characterized in a lexicon published by the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS).10 They include time-delayed IEDs, pro-
jected IEDs, and command IEDs, including suicide IEDs in vests 
and on vehicle-borne platforms.
There is also a supposition that IEDs are all complex devices, 
whereas, in reality, while they can present considerable additional 
technical challenges during search and disposal operations, IEDs 
can also be relatively simple and standardized in design. The 
vast majority of IEDs addressed to date in Iraq and Syria exist as 
locally manufactured landmines. They have been produced on a 
massive scale by the Islamic State and are more readily detected and 
disposed of than many industrially-manufactured landmines that 
may, for instance, have a low metal content.
The rising impact of IED attacks in public places has been ex-
tensively documented by Action On Armed Violence (AOAV).11 
Armed groups play an active and influential role in wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, and pose serious 
threats to national security in Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Such IED attacks 
Figure 2. A schematic to illustrate the objective and scope of the IMAS. The IMAS provide a framework to guide mine action in pursuit of its  
humanitarian objectives and in accordance with humanitarian principles. 
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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Mine action operators have always carried out risk assessments 
ahead of operations, however, this process has largely been implic-
it in SOPs or has relied on the experience from field staff. Given the 
complexity of some of the devices found in environments such as 
in Iraq and Syria, there is a real need to carry out more explicit risk 
assessments.15 This is reinforced by asymmetry of many conflicts, 
where large-scale battles cease but armed actors continue to exert 
influence and make use of explosives to disrupt and destabilize se-
curity. There is a requirement to systematize the evaluation of such 
contexts to ensure that mine action remains focused on humani-
tarian objectives and aims to uphold humanitarian principles. A 
more formalized guidance will benefit all mine action operations— 
whether in settings that exhibit IED contamination or otherwise.
The IMAS place a high priority on the issue of efficiency and 
the importance of targeting mine action resources appropriately. 
In rural environments, non-technical survey helps target clearance 
assets at suspected (SHA) or confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) 
based on evidence. In addition, specific training to improve eval-
uation skills and the ability of survey teams to accurately define 
such areas is elaborated in the IMAS. Similar guidance that targets 
the urban environment is lacking—including methodology for ur-
ban assessments, such as how to assess urban structures, take into 
account rubble (including rubble contaminated by explosive ord-
nance), and deal with threats of IEDs hidden in residential, occu-
pational, and community premises. 
Strengthening of the IMAS 
The IMAS have been designed as evolving standards that are con-
stantly reviewed and updated to ensure that they stay relevant and 
applicable to the changing nature of settings where mine action ac-
tivities are conducted. 
The IMAS currently fall short in the necessary guidance to ad-
dress tasks concerning IEDs. As a consequence, there is mounting 
consensus from the IMAS Review Board members to suggest that 
in light of the current political debates and operational demands 
there is a need to:
raise the profile of IEDs as an issue of con-
cern, but most incidents relate to car bombs 
and suicide attacks that fall well outside the 
parameters of mine action and the IMAS. 
Such devices and circumstances should be 
dealt with in separate guides and standards 
for use by security forces.
Incidents involving IEDs should be un-
packed to separate IED terror attacks using 
command detonation from those initiated 
by victims. IED operations in response to 
terror attacks fall within the purview of se-
curity forces. This is a different context than 
that where civilians are threatened from en-
during contamination from IEDs and that 
can be addressed during humanitarian op-
erations. 
Applicability of the IMAS to Address 
IEDs Today
The IMAS as they stand already cover ex-
plosive ordnance of an improvised nature. 
IEDs are included in the current nomencla-
ture found in the IMAS and there are at least 
nine specific references to IEDs within the 
existing chapters. These references do not limit the scope of cover-
age of the IMAS to a certain group of IEDs, such as pressure-plate 
IEDs, but rather are all-encompassing.12 
Key terms used by the mine action sector, such as explosive ord-
nance, landmines (in particular anti-personnel landmines), ERW 
and its components, such as UXO and abandoned explosive ord-
nance (AXO), include improvised devices within the context of the 
IMAS glossary.13,14 
Explicit and implicit references to IEDs in the IMAS have al-
lowed programs to frame operations that concern improvised 
devices within the existing standards. National programs in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Sri Lanka, and particularly Colombia are 
testament to this. 
Notwithstanding the framework that the IMAS provide for IEDD 
activities, there is a significant shortfall in the explicit guidance on 
IEDs in the IMAS. These deficiencies in the standards have become 
increasingly apparent as international attention focuses on countries 
such as Iraq and Syria, where the explosive contamination, partic-
ularly in areas formally under the control of the Islamic State, in-
cludes unexploded and abandoned IEDs, in urban as well as rural 
settings. In such theaters, operators have to review skill sets of their 
field staff, and national authorities are under pressure to scrutinize 
accreditation procedures of organizations under their responsibility. 
Furthermore, donors consider value for money from a wide variety 
of proposals and look to issue grants and contracts with appropriate 
reference to international norms. All such actors look to the IMAS 
for guidance on IEDD, currently with only limited success.
A focus on the additional guidance necessary in current contexts, 
including IEDs in the urban environment, is overdue. IEDs in these 
contexts increase the need for the IMAS to expand on: 
• Sound risk assessment processes. 
• Rapid and accurate surveys. 
• Safe and efficient processes for removal and/or destruction of 
explosive ordnance. 
• Reaffirmation of humanitarian, rather than military, 
objectives. 
Image 2. A selection of photos of improvised devices taken from archives of humanitarian 
operators.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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• State more clearly and up front in the IMAS the applicability 
of the IMAS concerning IEDs. Hence an amendment is need-
ed to IMAS 01.10, Guide for the application of International 
Mine Action (IMAS).
• Clarify selected terminology (IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine 
action terms, definitions and abbreviations) due to inconsis-
tencies with other key sources of terminology (e.g., the major 
disarmament/arms control conventions, and the UNMAS 
IED Lexicon).
• Add elements of technical guidance that will assist national 
authorities and operators to ensure the safety and effective-
ness of work. 
Other areas being considered and supported by GICHD 
include:
• A greater emphasis on risk assessments and risk management 
frameworks.
• A strengthening of competency levels, equipment, and train-
ing requirements. 
• Further guidance within the IMAS or Technical Notes on 
Mine Action (TNMA) addressing mine action in an urban 
environment, especially survey and information manage-
ment considerations. 
It is important to recall, however, that the IMAS remain a glob-
al framework and should not dwell on specific and local contexts. 
There is ample opportunity in the development of NMAS to adapt 
international standards concerning IEDs to national contexts.
Summary
The IMAS have an established architecture developed over two 
decades of work that has legitimacy and standing. They have been 
developed for the mine action sector for operations performed in 
pursuit of humanitarian objectives and in accordance with hu-
manitarian principles, and represent the set of standards used to 
promote and maintain quality during the implementation of mine 
action activities.
Mine action operations are not defined by weapon type but by 
the objectives they pursue and the context in which they take place. 
The IMAS therefore provide the overall framework to address all 
explosive ordnance, including IEDs within the boundaries of hu-
manitarian action. 
The suitability of a mine action operator to engage at a par-
ticular location or with a specific explosive device is based, 
first, on the operator being clear on the humanitarian objective 
of the undertaking, and on it having access to humanitarian 
space and, second, on the operator possessing staff with neces-
sary skills and equipment to perform the task. 
Although hundreds of thousands of IEDs, including locally-
manufactured landmines, have been cleared during mine action 
operations within the framework of the IMAS, the standards are in 
need of being strengthened in a number of areas. These include risk 
management, competency levels, training and equipment require-
ments, and amendments to IMAS 01.10 and IMAS 04.10 to clarify 
their application to improvised devices and to address inconsisten-
cies in the glossary of definitions. Further technical guidance in-
cluding operations in an urban environment should be included in 
the IMAS or a supporting TNMA.
Matters relating to IEDD operations in military and security 
contexts should be elaborated outside the IMAS—whether 
procedures to counter IED attacks particularly concerning vehicle- 
or person-borne IEDs, or aspects of forensics or intelligence that 
could be used to bring perpetrators to justice. All of these are 
incompatible with humanitarian action and principles and do not 
have space in the scope and remit of the IMAS.
There is a priority, however, to protect the integrity of the IMAS 
to address all relevant explosive ordnance, including IEDs, as the 
primary framework to manage operations that are humanitarian in 
nature.16 
See endnotes page 66
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the IMAS Review Board 
nor of UNMAS, the Board's Chair.
 
Mine action operations are not defined by 
weapon type, but by the objectives they pursue 
and the context in which they take place.
Figure 3. Improvised devices cleared in Iraq by MAG between July 2016 
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command 
Operated). 
Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.
Figure 4. Improvised devices cleared in Syria by MAG between July 2016 
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command 
Operated).
Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.
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